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Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter
in 2013–2014
Gunnar J. Weimann
Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University, The Hague, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Social media offer unprecedented opportunities to terrorist groups
to spread their message and target specific audiences for indoctrin-
ation and recruitment. In 2013 and 2014, social media, in particular
Twitter, overtook Internet forums as preferred space for jihadist
propaganda. This article looks into Arabic statements by Jabhat al-
Nusra, Islamic State and jihadist forum administrators and online
activists to argue that, beside the easier use of social media and dis-
ruption and infiltration of the forums, the conflict between the jihad-
ist groups accelerated the migration to social media and the
building of a presence on Twitter that provided relative resilience to
suspensions.
In early 2013, most analysts still agreed that, while increasing jihadist activities were
detected on Twitter, a microblogging site launched in 2006, jihadist Internet forums
would retain their central function in terrorist conversation and information distribu-
tion.1 Only one year later, Thomas Hegghammer felt that
Today forums remain important, but they seem to have been overtaken in 2013 by
Facebook and Twitter as the preferred platform for internal multi-user communication.
The jihadi migration to Facebook and Twitter has yet to be properly explained, but the
breakdown in trust on the forums may have been a contributing factor.2
By late 2014, jihadist forums had either disappeared or lost much of their former
relevance. Twitter had become a preferred platform not only for chatter among support-
ers but also for official releases by terrorist groups.3
Without doubt, the reasons for this shift are manifold. They include arrests of forum
administrators and the frequent disruption of jihadist forums. Disruption of forums,
despite all efforts to restore the platforms in the shortest time possible, resulted in a
relative decrease of popularity after coming back online and accelerated the migration
of members to either other forums,4 or ultimately to social media. In addition, the loss
of trust on the part of terrorist organizations that supply the forums with material and,
thus, their ability to serve as an authentic source for terrorist propaganda has been iden-
tified as a principal reason for the loss of relevance and the disappearance of forums.5
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This article aims to shed light on another factor contributing to the loss of relevance
of jihadist forums: the development of strategies by the so-called Islamic State (IS) and
Jabhat al-Nusra to ensure a resilient presence on social media, in particular Twitter,
which did not need authentication through jihadist forums. The two groups were not
the first jihadist organizations to create official Twitter accounts,6 and other jihadist
groups such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) recognized the potential value
of establishing themselves on Twitter during the same period of time.7 It is however
argued that the competition between IS and Jabhat al-Nusra precipitated the migration
from the forums to Twitter, as it forced the groups to build a resilient presence on the
microblogging site despite increasing efforts by Twitter at disruption. In effect, the com-
petition between IS and Jabhat al-Nusra stimulated innovation in terrorist communica-
tion in an increasingly hostile environment through the groups’ need to gain
ascendency over their opponents.
This study relies primarily on Arabic statements by the two groups and jihadist forum
administrators to analyze the motivations of their actions. The analysis relies on social
media posts, statements posted on social media and discussion forums, and documents
released by the actors involved, which were collected during monitoring of official
accounts in 2013 and 2014. The selection of the material was guided by the aim to trace
the relationship between known actors, in particular IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and prominent
jihadist discussion forums. During the period of time under review, communication by
these actors was still centralized to an extent that this methodology provided a compre-
hensive picture of their public statements. This notwithstanding, the approach has also
limitations. Rather than telling a complete story, online statements provide punctual infor-
mation on the declared motivations of the actors at a specific point in time. Entities repre-
senting particular actors disappear without explanation and others arise without defining
exactly the relationship to former iterations. Rather than establishing a continuity of the
actors involved, the sources allow identifying dynamics and trends.
The period under review was one of turmoil. In early April 2013, the leader of the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Abubakr al-Baghdadi, announced that Jabhat al-Nusra was
nothing but an extension of the ISI in Syria. ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra would merge under
the new name of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In an immediate reaction,
Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani rejected the merger and declared his
group to be an independent member of the Al Qaeda network responsible directly to Al
Qaeda’s nominal head Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri ordered ISI to restrict its activities
to Iraq and leave Syria to Jabhat al-Nusra, but by mid-2013, all mediation efforts by the Al
Qaeda leadership had failed. The mediator appointed by al-Zawahiri was killed in an ISIL
suicide attack; and ISIL rejected the orders given by al-Zawahiri.8 In 2013, tensions
between the factions increased gradually on the ground, as they tried to assert themselves
in the face of their competitors. The same was happening on the Internet, which illustrates
the importance attached to the online sphere by jihadist groups.
A Jihadist Online Infrastructure
Al Qaeda recognized early the possibilities that the Internet provided for disseminat-
ing propaganda messages, bypassing the state-controlled media in many Arab
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countries, such as Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda leaders felt that they were suffering a
“media siege,” which was meant to prevent them from reaching out to the Muslim
masses.9 Exploiting the possibilities offered by the Internet required special skills and
dedication to keep pace with new technologies and counterattacks on the group’s
online presence. This created opportunities for supporters with the necessary skill set
to provide services to jihadist groups. Al Qaeda and other groups have valued these
efforts and incorporated them in jihadist ideology under the label of “media jihad”
(al-jihad al-i’lami), which means that the spiritual reward of these activities is
equaled to participation in fighting. Following the death of Osama bin Laden in
May 2011, for example, the al-Fajr Media Centre (markaz al-fajr lil-i’lam, “dawn
media center”) called the Internet a “battlefield for jihad” and appealed to all jihadist
sympathizers to be “media mujahidin.”10
In an effort to become independent from mass media, such as al-Jazeera, Al Qaeda
and other groups created specific brands for propaganda releases, most prominently al-
Sahab Media, which, among other productions, has been in charge of publishing mes-
sages by Al Qaeda’s central leadership. Creating a name, logo, and corporate design
served to distinguish official propaganda productions from surrounding media and
Internet content and create an impression of trustworthiness. It, thus, helped to authen-
ticate original content issued by the groups.
After static websites of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations had been exposed to
repeated attacks, jihadist forums, containing disclaimers that shifted legal responsibility
for content from administrators to users, gained ascendency. The main jihadist forums
appear to have considered themselves as independent initiatives supporting the global
jihadist movement, rather than supporters of a specific group. Their vocation has been to
provide a stage for members of the global movement from different conflict zones.11
Nevertheless, in case they were accepted by Al Qaeda’s leadership as trusted distributors
of their message, they were engaged in a relationship that demanded submission and
acceptance of a hierarchy that ultimately depended on the Al Qaeda central leadership.12
Al Qaeda’s instrument to control the forums was the al-Fajr Media Centre.
Established in 2006, it provided the forums with original propaganda material from
jihadist groups within the Al Qaeda network. For both jihadist groups and forums,
adherence to the network controlled by al-Fajr Media was a sign of acceptance as part
of the global jihadist movement and a “proof of authenticity” of the message.13 With
regard to the forums, al-Fajr Media played a coordinating role, serving, for example, as
an instance to which forum administrators could appeal in case of dispute.14 Al-Fajr
Media also provided technical support to jihadist forums to remain online in the face of
attacks.15 The administrators of the Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, for example, had no
doubt that al-Fajr Media was directly linked to the Al Qaeda leadership, probably in the
person of Atiyatullah al-Libi, who was killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan in
August 2011.16
In early 2013, three top-tier jihadist forums were active under the umbrella of al-Fajr
Media: the Ansar al-Mujahidin Network (shabakat ansar al-mujahidin, “supporters of
mujahidin network”), the Shumukh al-Islam Network (shabakat shumukh al-Islam,
“loftiness of Islam network”), and the al-Fida’ Islamic Network (shabakat al-fida’ al-
Islamiyya, “sacrifice Islamic network”).
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Social Media and Jihadist Online Communication
When social media platforms first emerged, jihadist groups preferred to use them by
posting links that pointed back to the secure space of official websites or jihadist
forums, which continued to serve as tools for authentication.17 This certainly had to do
with the existing hierarchical system of verification embodied by al-Fajr Media that was
feeding the forums.18 By contrast, social media increased the possibilities for their oppo-
nents, be it state agencies, online activists or ordinary people, to counter jihadist propa-
ganda by posting alternative views, spreading disinformation or using blatant
impersonation.
This notwithstanding, jihadist forums, whose self-imposed role was to mediate
between terrorist groups and larger audiences, felt that they needed to reach out to
social media. Since 2011, Ansar al-Mujahidin and Shumukh al-Islam, among others,
actively encouraged supporters to develop social media profiles.19 The Ansar al-
Mujahidin English Forum created a Twitter account in October 2011, whereas the
Arabic forum of Ansar al-Mujahidin created a Facebook page, also in 2011, which was
fed automatically with contents from the forum.20 These efforts served to reach out to
social media users and lure them to their platforms.
Individual jihadist supporters also used social media to promote jihadist perceptions.
They took advantage of the activities of nonviolent activists in Syria that in 2012 were
documenting human rights abuses and war crimes by the Syrian regime of Bashar
al-Asad:
Social-media smart and professional jihadists adopted this treasure grove for their
propaganda. By rebranding and reframing the content created by civil society activists,
jihadi propaganda used these grievances to support a key jihadist self-perception; the
obligation to respond by force to defend and protect the Sunnites in Syria.21
Following them, self-styled media outlets started creating social media accounts, in
particular on Twitter, from where they linked to content available on jihadist
forums, but also other social media platforms, primarily YouTube and Facebook. As
a result, networks on Twitter sharing jihadist content began coexisting with jihad-
ist forums.22
By 2013, a prominent jihadist online author, Abu Sa’d al-Amili, lamented a gen-
eral decline in participation on jihadist forums. One of the reasons for this, in his
view, was that jihadists were migrating to social media platforms such as Twitter
and Facebook. Whereas the displacement was caused in part by the frequent disrup-
tion of the forums, he added, in the long run relying on social media was an error
that endangered the central position of jihadist forums, “our protected strongholds.”
People needed to recognize that social media were no adequate alternative to the
forums, for they were run by “our enemies.” Inevitably there would come a day
when “they shut their doors in our faces.” Therefore, the forums should remain the
“base and foundation” of jihadists online.23
Centralized Social Media Profiles
During the same period, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL recognized that they could not afford
abandoning social media to their opponents or supporters, for fear that these activities,
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if left uncontrolled, could dilute the corporate identity of the group. In early 2013,
Jabhat al-Nusra’s official Twitter account was embedded in a large network of support-
ing accounts.24 In the course of the year, Jabhat al-Nusra published a series of “media
statements,”25 signed by its central media outlet al-Manara al-Bayda’ Media Company
(mu’assasat al-manara al-bayda’ al-i’lamiyya, “white minaret [of the Umayyad mosque
in Damascus] media company”), in which it tried to regulate the activities of its sup-
porters on Twitter. In order to avoid confusion between official accounts and
supporters’ accounts, the group asked supporters that created accounts using the name
or logo of Jabhat al-Nusra or al-Manara al-Bayda’ Media to change this and to state “in
a stable, visible place” on their pages that these were supporting, not official, pages.26
The group insisted that it had no official website, forum, Facebook account, or
Wordpress page, after the initial ones had been suspended. The only official accounts of
Jabhat al-Nusra were those on the three major jihadist forums at the time, the
Shumukh al-Islam Network, the Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, and the al-Fida’ Islamic
Network, supported by Jabhat al-Nusra’s Twitter account (@JbhtAnNusrah, then after
suspension of the former @JabhtAnNusrah), “as a secondary source for Jabhat [al-
Nusra]’s publications.”27 Initially, the split between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL, which
occurred in April 2013, did not affect these positions.
In addition, on 7 July 2013, a new media outlet on Twitter was introduced: the
Himam News Agency (@Hemm_Agency, wikalat himam al-ikhbariyya, “concerns news
agency”). Himam News was described as an independent media company based in
Syria, which aimed to report on “the life of the mujahidin in particular, living their vic-
tories, telling their heroic deeds and following their social life.” It was “concerned with
covering the living conditions of Muslims in general, report their opinions, picture their
creativity and tell their stories.”28 The idea of creating a purportedly independent news
agency reporting on the non-combatant activities of a specific jihadist group had a pre-
cedent in the Madad News Agency, which was created by Ansar al-Shari’a in Yemen in
2011–12, when it was able to cease control of territory in southern Yemen.29
Himam News immediately started posting short videos, uploaded to YouTube and
advertised on its Twitter account, showing the provision of aid and services by Jabhat
al-Nusra to the local population and interviews with local residents on the benefits of
Jabhat al-Nusra’s administration. In a tweet on its official Twitter account in January
2014, Jabhat al-Nusra declared that Himam News’s correspondents were “deployed to
most regions in Syria, covering the activities of Jabhat al-Nusra in the liberated areas.”30
Himam News was active until late August 2014, after which it disappeared.31
In the same period, following the April 2013 split, ISIL started creating its own media
profile. In mid-August 2013, ISIL declared that, during a temporary interruption of the
publication of its statements and media productions, which was due to “the known cir-
cumstances through which the Levant arena has gone,” supporters on social media
accounts had tried to fill the gap by posting news and comments with regard to ISIL.32
Others, however, exploited the opportunity to spread, under its name, “fabricated news,
exaggerations and opinions that do not express the programme and direction” of ISIL.
Some of these used names, titles, and logos of ISIL or one of its media outlets, such as
al-Furqan Media or al-I’tisam Media, to suggest an official link or by claiming that they
were linked to some field commander in Syria. The statement insisted that the only
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official communication channels of the group were the al-I’tisam Media account on the
Shumukh al-Islam Network and its official Twitter account.
The al-I’tisam Media Production Company (mu’assasat al-i’tisam lil-intaj al-i’lami,
“adherence [to God’s rope] media production company”) had emerged in March 2013
with a first video production that still focused on terrorist activities in Iraq.33 It was
described as an entity of the “information ministry” (wizarat al-i’lam) of ISI. Since
August 2013, al-I’tisam Media started issuing a series of videos, the “Windows onto the
land of epic battles” (nawafidh ala ard al-malahim) series, which combined coverage of
ISIL combats with social activities and services provided to the population in areas con-
trolled by ISIL.34 These videos were posted simultaneously on jihadist forums and the
official Twitter account of al-I’tisam Media, which was suspended and had to be re-cre-
ated several times in 2013. Whereas al-I’tisam Media functioned in ways similar to those
of Himam News, it had been identified since the beginning as an official media outlet
of ISI/ISIL. Maybe for this reason the brand of al-I’tisam Media was abandoned in
2015. By this time, its news agency function had been replaced by A’maq News, which,
starting in late 2014, has functioned as an allegedly independent “news agency” covering
IS activities.
Thus, the split in 2013 was followed by a period in which both groups tried to
develop centralized media profiles that were adapted to social media use. Nevertheless,
the forums still served as a backup and authentication tool in case of account suspen-
sion and impersonation attempts on Twitter. Followers of both groups were requested
to identify their services clearly as supporting activities.
Diffusion
This situation changed in 2014. The tensions between ISIL and the rest of the Syrian
armed opposition escalated into large-scale violence through an attempt by large seg-
ments of the opposition to drive ISIL out of Syria at the turn of 2014. Jabhat al-Nusra
first tried to mediate, but was quickly drawn into the conflict. As a result of the
intransigent positions of ISIL, Al Qaeda’s central leadership officially excluded the group
from the Al Qaeda network in late January 2014.35 ISIL’s defiant attitude seemed to be
justified in the light of its military successes: in June ISIL forces conducted a large-scale
offensive from Syria across the Iraqi border, taking control of large swathes of northern
Iraq, including the second largest Iraqi city Mosul. Shortly afterward, ISIL announced
that it had reestablished the caliphate, changed its name to Islamic State and declared
that all other jihadist groups in areas being or coming under its control were thereby
dissolved. It thus may not come as a surprise that, in late July, Jabhat al-Nusra vowed
to deliver, in cooperation with other jihadist groups in Syria, the land and the people
from extremists, in a clear reference to IS.36
In January 2014, ISIL started creating specific Twitter accounts for each of its
“provinces” (wilayat, sing. wilaya), which reported on local events. Maybe this was trig-
gered by a disruption of communications between regional ISIL factions and the cen-
tralized media outlets due to the hostilities. The “provincial” Twitter accounts quickly
developed into a network with a corporate identity, in which, if one account was sus-
pended, the others could be used to authenticate an account newly created to replace
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the suspended one. Included in this network of accounts were also those of the official
media outlets, including al-Furqan Media and al-I’tisam Media. This resulted in a net-
work with sufficient resilience to withstand occasional suspensions. As a result, ISIL/IS
was not forced anymore to rely on the authentication through the forums.
Whereas in April 2014, Jabhat al-Nusra still denied that al-Manara al-Bayda’ Media
had an official Twitter account,37 it changed its position shortly afterward, probably in
reaction to the new strategy developed by IS. In July it introduced a Twitter account for
the “network of correspondents of al-Manara al-Bayda’,” whose aim was “continuous
coverage of local Jabhat al-Nusra news from different regions.”38 Al-Manara al-Bayda’
Media’s “network of correspondents” functioned in ways similar to the ISIL network of
“provinces,” with Twitter accounts with regional responsibilities that served to authenti-
cate one another in case of suspension.
The resilience of IS’s network of accounts was put to the test by the start of proactive
suspension of accounts promoting terrorism by Twitter. The platform started develop-
ing capacities to disrupt IS propaganda messaging on a massive scale in August 2014,
after IS had published a video showing the assassination of U.S. American journalist
and video reporter James Foley.39 IS tried to recreate its network of accounts on other
platforms, including VKontakte (vk.com), but was quickly evicted. The group had to
change strategy again and decided to replace authentication through dedicated accounts
by authentication through the creation of massive numbers of accounts that posted
identical messages simultaneously. These accounts were bound together by hashtags,
first referring to IS “provinces” or its central media outlets, then to titles of new
releases. These hashtags ensured that, even if accounts were deleted quickly, it was pos-
sible to find other postings that were still active. This system remained workable until
the 13 November 2015 attacks in Paris, after which the hashtags were massively
spammed by IS opponents.40
During the same period, Jabhat al-Nusra’s “network of correspondents” faced suspen-
sions to a far lesser extent and could largely maintain its network of “correspondents”
even after it renamed into Jabhat Fath al-Sham in July 2016, relinquishing publicly its
relation to Al Qaeda. While the brand of al-Manara al-Bayda’ Media was abandoned
after the change, the “network of correspondents” remained active, until Jabhat Fath al-
Sham merged with other jihadist groups to form Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in early 2017.
Changing corporate identity might have been another strategy to evade eviction.
The Reaction of the Forums
By the end of 2014, then, both IS and Jabhat al-Nusra had implemented strategies to
maintain a sufficiently resilient presence on Twitter and distinguish their message from
disinformation without the need for authentication through jihadist forums. A major
motivation for this was certainly the need to be present in the space where their sup-
porters communicated. In addition, it now became clear that the forums were not the
independent entities that they purported to be, and the fact that they had to show loy-
alty to either camp weakened their position further. In what follows, the positions of
two of the major forums, the Ansar al-Mujahidin Network and the Shumukh al-Islam
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Network, are examined. Ansar al-Mujahidin remained firmly within the al-Fajr Media
network, whereas Shumukh al-Islam sided with IS.
With regard to the mounting tensions in Syria, the administrators of Ansar al-
Mujahidin warned, in September 2013, all “those who follow [Ansar al-Mujahidin] and
all other writers and Muslims on Twitter that have commented on recent events” that
they had to be careful not to side with one of the conflicting parties and to abstain
from slandering the opposing party.41 Supporters were asked to convey a positive image
of the “mujahidin” and their supporters and avoid inciting Muslims, and in particular
Muslim scholars, against them. They were enjoined to think highly of Muslims in gen-
eral, and jihadist scholars in particular. In light of this advice, Ansar al-Mujahidin stated
its commitment to remain neutral in the conflict between different jihadist groups or
currents and to prevent its members from verbally attacking or insulting Muslims and
jihadist scholars, while allowing constructive criticism. At the same time, Ansar al-
Mujahidin emphasized that its abstention from publishing official releases of a particular
group was not to be understood as an attack or an insult and did not put into question
the validity of the struggle of this group. Finally, it stressed that the official position of
the Network was published exclusively on its official accounts on “jihadist networks,”
that is forums, and on its official Twitter account.
The statement seems to be directed primarily to supporters of ISIL at the time, due
to its emphasis on the respect due to jihadist scholars. Most prominent jihadist ideo-
logues had supported Al Qaeda in the dispute and now faced strong reactions from
social media users sympathetic of ISIL. The forum administrators admitted indirectly
that they stopped publishing ISIL releases but tried to explain that this was not to be
seen as criticism. One cannot escape the impression that this decision might have been
imposed on the forum by the al-Fajr Media administration. At some point after this,
the Arabic Ansar al-Mujahidin forum disappeared from the Internet.42
Shumukh al-Islam’s story is very different. In a first reaction after the outbreak of
violence between the ISIL and other armed opposition groups in Syria, the Shumukh al-
Islam Network issued, on 5 January 2014, a statement in support of ISIL.43 In its cap-
acity as
one of the frontlines [thaghr] of jihadi media, which provided its best men for the cause of
continuing the word of truth, unifying the ranks of the mujahidin, containing the
dissentions and calamities brought to us by the Crusader enemy and his supporters from
among those who wear the garment of advice and concern for the religion,
the Shumukh al-Islam Network deplored the state of “our brothers in the Levant of
caliphate, especially our brothers in the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant [ISIL],”
who for many years had been steadfast and perseverant, but now faced new ways
employed by the enemies of Islam, who
have found a new location in which to squirt out their venom and evil—Twitter—after the
jihadi networks had restrained them, repelled their obstruction and counteracted them
with all might. Some of them wear the garment of religion to lead [others] astray from
God’s path and issue fatwas on the killing of mujahidin and the lawfulness of [shedding]
their blood.
The statement continued by pointing out that a war was being waged against the
“mujahidin for God’s cause” in Syria by “criminal gangs” equipped and trained by
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Istanbul and Amman, after some armed factions were incited to fight against “our
brothers in the Islamic State.” They killed both “ansar” (i.e., Syrian members) and
“muhajirun” (i.e., foreigners) and attacked the families of the “muhajirun.” In the light
of this, the Shumukh al-Islam Network demanded that all truthful “mujahid” groups
side with the ISIL in this proxy war, for this was not a war against Abubakr al-
Baghdadi and his men but against anyone who strove to implement the Sharia. Any
incitement against ISIL had to stop, and a Sharia tribunal was to be established to iden-
tify those responsible for the in-fighting. The authors stressed that self-defense and the
repelling of aggression were legitimate under Islam.
Shumukh al-Islam’s appeals for protecting ISIL against the aggression that it suffered
continued until the administrators officially declared their support of ISIL in a state-
ment published on 10 March 2014.44 The authors insisted that the Shumukh al-Islam
Network had existed for seven years,
during which we have lost many of our cadres, while the others are awaiting [capture], are
captives or exiles, all for the sole purpose of communicating the voice of the people of
jihad to the umma;
seven years of supporting the mujahidin and striving for unity of their ranks without
creating fissions between them;
seven years of advising and directing the supporters of jihad;
seven years of clarity of vision and programme.
In the current circumstances, the statement continued, Shumukh al-Islam needed to
take a position and, therefore, declared that it supported ISIL, against which all nations
of unbelief, hypocrisy, and apostasy had conspired. Nevertheless, Shumukh al-Islam
would not tolerate on its platform anyone slandering or defaming jihadist scholars or
commanders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri. Such members would be expelled: “We
cannot let Shumukh [al-Islam] become pasture for those who want to behave in evil
manners and attack jihadi commanders and their representatives.” In line with this,
Shumukh al-Islam would provide advice and direction to Jabhat al-Nusra, which at the
same time it accused of helping “apostates, rebels, thieves etc., who fight our brothers in
the [Islamic] State.” Shumukh al-Islam considered Jabhat al-Nusra “our brothers,”
whom they were obliged to guide back to the truth. All postings inciting further conflict
would be prevented. Nevertheless, all members of Shumukh al-Islam, in particular its
senior members, were called upon to strive for reconciliation between the “mujahidin”
and to close the ranks. The statement finished with a renewed call for a Sharia tribunal
to settle the conflict between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL.
In response to this statement, Jabhat al-Nusra announced that it would stop distribut-
ing its propaganda via the Shumukh al-Islam Network.45 “Since the start of the dispute
between Jabhat [al-Nusra] and the [Islamic] State and the interruption of the publica-
tion [of propaganda statements], while we all awaited the decision of Shaykh [Ayman]
al-Zawahiri,”46 and even after its publication, Shumukh al-Islam sided with the ISIL.
Shumukh al-Islam was accused of not taking action against forum members openly
insulting Jabhat al-Nusra. Recent publications by its “media arm,” in a likely reference
to Shumukh al-Islam’s al-Ma’sada Media Company, showed that it had lost “every
meaning of professionalism and trustworthiness, on which the lofty edifice of media
jihad had been based for years.”
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In late April 2014, Shumukh al-Islam appealed to its supporters—“you should con-
sider yourselves family of the al-Shumukh house”—to show commitment by contribu-
ting to remedy and contain the conflict.47 Public forums and chatrooms should not be
used to discuss the origin of the conflict. This should be left to jihadist leaders and
advisers (ahl al-hall wal-aqd)48 in private conversations. Equally, the conflict should not
be transferred to arenas outside Syria. Shumukh al-Islam was committed to containing
it and so should its members. Shumukh al-Islam pledged that, in addition to ISIL pro-
ductions, it would continue publishing propaganda items from all groups accredited
with al-Fajr Media (jami’ al-jihat al-mu’tamada lada al-Fajr), as long as those materials
did not openly oppose one of the parties in the conflict. It declared that it had launched
a “media initiative” to bring the concerned parties—“the [Islamic] State, Jabhat [al-
Nusra], al-Fajr [Media], al-Fida’ [Network]”—back together. Shumukh al-Islam empha-
sized again that constructive criticism was wanted but verbal attacks and slander would
not be tolerated. Any content that might increase hatred and tension would be deleted.
Unacceptable behavior on Shumukh al-Islam included the use of links to the Network
in content that was copied and pasted from it, presumably to social media, without
prior permission. Official publications of jihadist groups were to be disseminated exclu-
sively through official accounts, with the exception of those that were disseminated
through official Twitter accounts. It was forbidden to copy insults and false information
from Twitter and other social media into Shumukh al-Islam. Shumukh al-Islam should
be a place of support only. Silence should be kept about the “mujahidin’s” disagree-
ments or situation, the reality of which was unknown to outsiders (and, thus, to the
community of online supporters of either camp).
What is striking in Shumukh al-Islam’s attitude is its insistence on the length of its
struggle and the sacrifice that it had made. This seems to suggest that its long-standing
legitimacy as one of the major jihadist forums was at stake when it started supporting
ISIL, likely in defiance of instructions given by al-Fajr Media. The reference to Twitter
as a main arena in which the fight against ISIL was led reveals that the competition
with social media was perceived as another threat to the position of the forum as cen-
tral communication space.
Whereas Shumukh al-Islam supported ISIL, it tried to keep its position as an inde-
pendent service provider to all jihadist groups, which is evidenced by its pledge not to
allow the slandering of Ayman al-Zawahiri and to publish material from all groups
linked to al-Fajr Media, as long as they did not contain inflammatory statements against
one of the parties. Nevertheless, Shumukh al-Islam’s condescending attitude toward
Jabhat al-Nusra led the latter to disown it. The appeals for a tribunal to settle the con-
flict illustrate the forum’s difficult position, in the light of ISIL’s categorical refusal to
submit to mediation. In the end, Shumukh al-Islam tried to contain the conflict by pre-
venting users from discussing its causes on the forum and from applying it to areas out-
side Syria. To achieve this, it intended to control the contents that were copied from
and to social media.
Another aspect is of importance: Shumukh al-Islam actively tried to involve its sup-
porters to contribute to the struggle and get involved. Likely in response to its weakened
relations with al-Fajr Media, Shumukh al-Islam seems to have sought to compensate the
impending loss of relevance by attracting new actors that had appeared on social media.
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Re-Configuration
In the meantime, supporters of the two camps were already re-grouping on social
media. A comprehensive overview of these initiatives cannot be provided here due to
limited space. Two examples will be discussed, one in support of Al Qaeda and one in
support of IS.
In April 2014, the al-Tahaya Media Company (mu’assasat al-tahaya lil-i’lam,
“rememberances media company”) was established. In its founding statement,49 the
entity stated that “after the jihadi media reached a dangerous and rough stage that
needs [taking] a stance of review, reconstruction and re-assessment after a state of
chaos, and imposing a realistic policy by some [media] companies on the mujahidin
and their supporters,” the al-Tahaya Media Company was launched as “one spearhead
of the mujahidin against the imams of unbelief and hypocrisy,” which would “represent
our commanders, scholars, mujahidin and prisoners.” In particular, al-Tahaya Media
defined as its tasks “the transcription and translation of material issued by the [two offi-
cial Jabhat al-Nusra media outlets], the al-Basira and al-Manara al-Bayda’ Companies”
and “some works of truthful mujahidin everywhere.” It specifically committed to “the
policies of our brothers in the al-Fajr Media Centre.”
Since its launch, al-Tahaya Media has issued hundreds of documents, including tran-
scripts of video and audio speeches by Al Qaeda leaders and ideologues.50 Its main aim
seems to be to put these texts into circulation on social media and file sharing sites
and, thereby, ensure that they remain available also outside jihadist forums and web-
sites.51 Its explicit reference to the al-Fajr Media Centre shows that this endeavor aimed
to perpetuate the centralized hierarchical communication structure built by Al Qaeda.
By contrast, the creation of the Media Front for the Support of the Islamic State
(al-jabha al-i’lamiyya li-nusrat al-dawla al-Islamiyya) was the culmination of a self-
organization of activists, bringing together a number of self-proclaimed entities on
social media that were supporting IS. In its founding manifesto, published in October
2014,52 the authors announced that the “media soldiers in support of the State of Islam”
created a “unified central leadership” comprising the “most important supporting jihadi
media companies” to “support the blessed global caliphate project.” As examples of the
effectiveness of online propaganda, they referred to the “terror” sparked in America by
the decapitation of James Foley, the effect of Twitter hashtag campaigns and the
productions of IS’s al-Hayat Media Centre, which specialized in propaganda, such as
the English-language magazine Dabiq, directed to non-Arab audiences. The “legend of
the lone wolf,” the statement said, was over. IS supporters should join the “structure of
your blessed front” (i.e., the Media Front). In particular, they appealed to technical
experts, hackers, translators, media activists, graphic designers, video and audio pro-
ducers, experts in Arabic language, scenario writers, nashid composers, and poets to
join. People that did not have such capabilities could transcribe texts, upload files, and
disseminate them on social media. All participating entities would conserve their
original name. The statement contains a list of entities that joined the Media Front:
al-Ghuraba’ Media; al-Wafa’ Media Production; al-Battar Media; al-Wagha Media;
al-Ansar League; A’isha Media Centre; Minbar al-Ansar Room; Fada’ih al-Almaniyya
Media Production; Dabiq Media; Mahsud Jihadi Media; al-Minhaj Media Production;
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Nasa’im Audio Production; Adwa’ al-Ribat Media Production; al-Raqqa Islamic
Network; and al-Ansar Islamic Network.
Some of the entities composing the Media Front for the Support of the Islamic State
subsequently became prominent media outlets on social media promoting IS. They
developed close relationships with the organization.53
Analysis
The competition between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL after April 2013 accelerated a pro-
cess that had been underway for some time, the migration of jihadist activity from dis-
cussion forums to social media. As a result, it helped to speed up the loss of relevance
of jihadist forums, which had been undermined over the years by infiltration
and disruption.
Individual supporters of jihadism had started using Twitter and other social media
platforms long before, and their activity had reached an extent that put the jihadist
groups at risk of losing control over their communication. The groups thus had to
relinquish their initial reluctance and establish their own presence on social media, in
particular Twitter. The matter acquired more urgency after the April 2013 split between
Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL, when neither could afford leaving the field to its competitor.
Already at this stage, the two groups chose slightly different approaches. Jabhat al-
Nusra remained firmly within the al-Fajr Media system with its three major forums,
using Twitter only as a “secondary” source for its official releases. It, nevertheless, sup-
plemented its official media outlet, al-Manara al-Bayda’ Media, with a new format
adapted to social media, Himam News. By contrast, from the beginning, ISIL treated
Twitter and the Shumukh al-Islam Network, the only top-tier forum openly siding with
it, as equally valid sources for its propaganda. This might have been due to an initially
weak position, as the growing conflict with Al Qaeda risked leading to the exclusion of
ISIL, and consequently Shumukh al-Islam, from established distribution channels. ISIL,
to a certain extent, copied Jabhat al-Nusra’s approach of establishing a media outlet
adapted to social media, al-I’tisam Media, even if the distribution of tasks between the
former and ISIL’s central media outlet, al-Furqan Media remained less clear. In this ini-
tial phase both groups adopted a strategy of strict branding to authenticate their mes-
sages on Twitter.
The reliance on branding of official accounts with possible verification through the
forums served the requirement of authentication. It, however, offered only limited resili-
ence and carried the risk of interruption of messaging during the time needed to
announce a new account through the forums, thereby opening opportunities for the
opponent. This likely motivated the development of a new strategy relying on a network
of accounts that were used to introduce and verify new accounts without passing
through the forums. ISIL “provincial” accounts, possibly created following a temporary
breakdown of the centralized communication system of ISIL in early 2014, rapidly
developed into a network with a clear corporate identity on Twitter, thereby forming an
additional layer in which the official media outlet accounts were embedded. The fact
that Jabhat al-Nusra adopted a similar system on Twitter indicates that it was deemed a
successful strategy. In addition to providing additional breadth to the reporting, the
36 G. WEIMANN
new system afforded relative resilience against suspensions and independence from
jihadist forums for verification and the related delay or interruption of messaging.
Thus, for the first time, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL bypassed the forums, a fact that con-
tributed greatly to the latter’s loss of relevance.
Another factor is the apparent breakdown of the centralized distribution system con-
trolled by Al Qaeda through the al-Fajr Media Centre. The reactions of the forums put
in evidence the former central position of al-Fajr Media. On the one hand, the example
of Ansar al-Mujahidin shows the continuing commitment to the al-Fajr Media network.
Shumukh al-Islam’s example, on the other hand, with the forum insisting on its long
trajectory of jihadist activism, clearly displays fear of losing legitimacy in case of exclu-
sion, presumably as a result of disobedience. To compensate, Shumukh al-Islam tried to
mobilize its followers to work toward reconciliation. In addition, and contrary to ISIL,
Shumukh al-Islam warned its supporters of the dangers of Twitter and, finally, tried to
impose strict controls on the information exchanged between the forum and Twitter.
All these attempts seem to have remained largely futile.
During the same period, efforts increased to structure supporters’ activities on
Twitter in support of the two camps. While the available sources do not allow establish-
ing a personal link between the entities, by referring to al-Fajr Media in its founding
statement, al-Tahaya Media put itself in the line of tradition of Al Qaeda’s supervisory
body and tried to preserve Al Qaeda’s legacy on the Internet. By contrast, ISIL support-
ers created self-styled media entities on Twitter, which then formed an alliance of media
activists that actively recruited skilled, like-minded individuals. It is more than likely
that these networks of supporters on social media served as a recruitment pool for IS’s
media capabilities. This explains the enormous innovation capacity of IS with regard to
media production and dissemination that gained it its ascendancy in the online sphere
for the major part of 2015 and 2016.
When IS supporters were finally forced to seek alternative platforms to replace the
increasingly contested space on Twitter, they did not fall back on jihadist forums.
At the time of writing, Shumukh al-Islam continued active—despite frequent changes
of its Uniform Resource Locator, probably as a result of disruption efforts—and
posted IS propaganda in a timely manner. However, only registered users could
access content posted on it; and no possibility to register new accounts was pro-
vided.54 In addition, technology has evolved, and discussion forums that are difficult
to access from smartphones and other mobile devices are far less attractive at pre-
sent. Instead, the bulk of jihadist supporters and consequently also terrorist groups
and their media outlets have moved to Telegram, a cloud-based encrypted messaging
service that allows recreating the community that cannot thrive anymore on
Twitter.55 Jabhat al-Nusra was exposed to a lesser degree to suspensions56 and, thus,
was not forced to innovate.
Conclusion
For terrorist groups, public communication fulfills multiple purposes, including intimi-
dating opponents, justifying violent acts, and attracting volunteers and funding. To
achieve this, they need access to public space and, simultaneously, must ensure that
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their audiences can distinguish their messages from the surrounding noise and disinfor-
mation. The period under review illustrates the interplay between these two basic, but
often contradicting, requirements of terrorist communication in a hostile online
environment.
Terrorist groups must be present in places where their supporters are, if they want to
exercise some degree of control over what is said about them, both by their supporters
and opponents. Forums and Twitter both provide a public space to the extent that
information posted on both types of platforms can be accessed openly and is indexed
by search engines. Twitter, of course, offers far greater opportunities to engage directly
with audiences beyond the closed jihadist community.
On forums, authentication is achieved through distribution channels providing exclu-
sive access to original material from terrorist groups, on the one hand, and the control
of the content through forum administrators, on the other. It has become apparent that
the impression of independence of the forums needs qualification, as at least the major
ones have been engaged in a hierarchical relationship with terrorist organizations, as
exemplified by Al Qaeda’s al-Fajr Media. Their legitimacy resided in the faithful imple-
mentation of the publishing policies defined by al-Fajr Media.
Such internal disciplinary mechanisms are absent on Twitter. Unable to control con-
tent directly, terrorist groups needed to be present on Twitter themselves, to counter
their opponents as much as to discipline their supporters. They thus started to dissem-
inate their content directly without the services of forum administrators. New authenti-
cation mechanisms needed to be designed, such as the use of networks of accounts to
create resilience. Simultaneously, the competition between IS and Al Qaeda led to the
creation of new media outlets and an escalation of content production.
Social media platforms not only challenged the established communication methods
of terrorist groups but made it difficult for jihadist activists to influence the discourse
in ways done by forum administrators in the past. The equivalent of forum administra-
tors on Twitter, and now Telegram, is media entities established with the purpose to
support a terrorist group. Contrary to forum administrators, these entities cannot exer-
cise control over the content posted by other users and must try to influence their audi-
ences with their own content output, which must be disseminated widely and clearly
branded to achieve authentication.
Some entities, such as al-Tahaya Media, which presumably have direct access to a
network controlled by a terrorist group, apply a top-down approach, aiming to maintain
available online central texts and utterances of the group that they support. Others, as
those organized in the Media Front for the Support of the Islamic State, grow bottom-
up, creating alliances of seemingly independent entities to form a front in support of a
certain group, presumably one that breaks with established communication patterns.
Whatever strategies are devised to maintain a presence in a hostile online environ-
ment, these do not result from a carefully designed plan but respond in flexible ways to
current challenges. The answers found are subsequently formalized into a strategy that
serves until the next wave of disruption necessitates further innovation.
The shift of Jabhat al-Nusra and IS from forums to Twitter goes to show that innov-
ation in communication is a reaction to external pressure. The al-Fajr Media Centre
was established to stabilize the system of discussion forums that had formed as a
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reaction to attacks on websites. Once established, however, for a long time, the al-Fajr
Media system hindered innovation with regard to exploiting the new opportunities of
the social media by Al Qaeda–linked groups. Eventually, it was the escalating conflict
within the jihadist movement and, consequently, the breakdown of the al-Fajr Media
system that spurred innovation and pushed the groups into the hostile environment of
Twitter. Here, innovation was led by IS, which through its depiction of extreme violence
and aggressive incitement of terrorism, quickly managed to concentrate countermeas-
ures on itself.
Cut off from the established information distribution channels and facing increasing
disruption efforts, IS reached out for new talent and within a short period of time used
this innovative force to create the most powerful propaganda machinery known from
any nonstate group in history.
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